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Draft Legislation on the Public Sector Negotiating System

AN ATTEMPT TO TURN THE DECREES INTO A PERMANENT SYSTEM

Summary

Background and Goals of the Draft Legislation

On Thursday, December 20, 1984, the government tabled draft legislation on the negotiating system in the public and parapublic sectors.

This gesture on the part of the government is the latest piece in a now almost completed puzzle whose theme could be summarized as "how to make up the rules while pretending to negotiate".

This bill is the government's response to the counter-proposal made by the three labour centrals following the announcement of its intention to modify the negotiating system and its refusal to debate the issue in the Conseil consultatif du travail et de la main d'oeuvre (Consultative Committee on Labour and Manpower) or at the Consultative Commission on Labour and the Revision of the Labour Code, known as the "Beaudry Commission".

The centrals' counter-proposal had been to state that they were open to discussion on the negotiating system as long as any discussions that did take place also addressed the problems experienced in the different workplaces in social affairs and education (see the proposal to re-open the decrees in order to negotiate a collective agreement by March 31). The centrals made this counter-proposal despite the fact that they find the present system satisfactory in general.

But the official goal of the reform — real and serious exchange among the different parties negotiating — is a method which the present government has forgotten how to use. It is more accustomed to decrees, regulations and special legislation. Indeed, the real goals of the government's actions appeared clearer: make some political capital for itself — not by coming to any agreement with the employees, but by decreeing "civilized" labour relations, an end to the raging "barbarity" in the public and para-public sectors, the withdrawal of the right to strike. In short, it was a question of avoiding any possibility of disagreement, thus, of avoiding negotiations themselves.

In order to attain its goal, the government had to act. In May, the document entitled **La recherche d'un nouvel équilibre ("Seeking a New Equlibrium")** was published; in October, the supposed offer of a basic agreement; in December, the draft legislation; at the end of January, a parliamentary commission...

The government is not heading off the risk of strikes by attacking the problems — the real problems — which lead to them. Instead, it denies these problems, doesn't even question its own decrees... In the eyes of the government, the workers of the public and para-public sectors are the PROBLEM; it's the irresponsibility of the unions and their perpetual attempt to cause confrontation; they aren't reasonable, they don't want to hear anything, understand anything. In order to "get Québec out of the rut of confrontation"(1), the government attacks the right to strike and centralized negotiations, wants to do away with collective agreements through desynchronized negotiations, denying us the right to negotiate our salaries.

(1) Quoted from the statement made by Minister Clerc upon tabling of his bill in chambers.

I- Bill on the Negotiating System

A study of the bill on the system for negotiating collective agreements in the public and para-public sectors reveals that many articles contained in it are ambiguous and open to several different interpretations. Also, the text is incomplete on purpose (Appendix A is missing). All of this makes understanding and analyzing it particularly complex.

This section is intended to synthesize the key aspects of this bill and present the four-tier negotiating mechanism which it proposes for CEGEPs.

A) KEY ASPECTS OF THE DRAFT LEGISLATION ON THE PUBLIC SECTOR NEGOTIATING SYSTEM

1. Establishment of Five Negotiating Sub-Committees in Social Affairs

Management organizations would control the selection of issues that would be presented to each sub-committee and those which would go to the social affairs table; this denies recognition of us as a party to negotiations.

2. Decentralization of Articles to do with the Organization of Work, Transfers and Labour Rights

The consent of management negotiating committees will be required in order for these matters to be negotiated at the provincial level.

The Treasury Board which piloted this bill is the same body which gives management negotiating committees their negotiating mandates.

It is the right to negotiate provincially that is being threatened here.

This is a reversal of the Bill 55 principle which provided for everything being negotiated at the provincial level unless the parties or the government decide otherwise.

3. Desynchronization of Negotiations

Staggering the expiry dates of different chapters of the collective agreement:

- salary provisions on an annual basis

- local or regional agreements would be in force for two years unless the parties modify them before their expiry
- the remaining part of the provincial contract would remain in force for three years (if tradition is any indication).

4. Introduction of Permanent Negotiations

At any time, the parties can re-negotiate local or regional agreements in whole or in part.

The provincial contract can provide modalities for discussion among the parties while it is in force.

5. Limiting the Right to Strike in terms of the Kind of Working Conditions over which the Workers can Strike

No right to strike over wages or over matters negotiated locally or regionally.

Intervention of a mediator-arbitrator in local negotiations whose decisions would be equivalent to a signed agreement if both parties ask him/her to hand down a ruling.

6. Mediation and Compulsory Publication of Mediation Report before Resorting to a Strike on Issues Negotiated Provincially:

Minimum period of time: 20 days
Probable period of time: 50 days

7. Non-negotiability of Wages

Establishment of the Institut de recherche sur la rémunération, (The Institute of Research on Remuneration).

Wages would be decreed every year.

8. Powers of Restitution

In the event of conflict, powers of intervention conferred upon the Essential Services Council whose decisions have the status of a Superior Court ruling. Any defiance would be equivalent to contempt of court.

Such powers would focus on:

- ordering any person to conform to the law, the collective agreement or essential service lists.
- ordering restitution to any person involved
- establishing the monetary value of any damages suffered by a person as a result of a conflict, and ordering the said amount to be paid.

It is noteworthy that the power of restitution is conferred upon it even if no essential service is required (i.e., in education, transportation and other areas). It intervenes in terms of the services to which the public is entitled.

B) THE FOUR LEVELS OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR CEGEPs

1- Wages

Principle of non-negotiability of wages (article 2)

Creation of the Institut de recherche sur la rémunération (article 4)

Managed by a board of directors composed of 13 members appointed by the government:

- six selected from among the persons whose names are on the lists drawn up by the labour unions;
- six appointed after consultation of management organizations;
- a president appointed after consultation of labour and management organizations (articles 50 and 51).

By November 30 at the latest, publication of a report on the comparative state and evolution of overall public-private wages (article 63).

December to March: discussion period among the parties (article 70).

No right to strike over wages (article 79).

March: tabling for information of proposed settlement on wages in the National Assembly for the current year (article 71).

April: adoption by the Council of Ministers of a settlement on wages for the current year (article 71).

Duration of wage settlement: one year (article 71).

2. Local or Regional Negotiations

Local negotiations of matters provided on the organization of work, promotion, transfer or movement of personnel and union rights (article 21).

These matters can be negotiated at the regional or provincial level if the provincial parties agree (article 21).

If the parties do so agree, any other matter can be negotiated at the local or regional level (article 21).

No right to strike over local or regional negotiations (article 79).

On-going (permanent) and desynchronized negotiations:

- a union and an employer can negotiate the replacement, modification, addition or annulment of a stipulation in the collective agreement at any time (article 29);
- this agreement lasts two years unless the parties decide to modify it before it expires (article 30);

Intervention of a third party:

- appointment of a mediator/arbitrator by the Minister of Labour upon request by either party after three negotiating sessions (article 31);
- role of the mediator/arbitrator: to help the parties settle their disagreement (article 31);
- the parties can ask the mediator/arbitrator (30 days after his/her appointment) to rule on their disagreement (article 33);
- if the mediator/arbitrator feels that a settlement is possible between the parties, he/she does not rule on the disagreement; he makes a report of his recommendations to the parties and makes this report public 10 days later (article 35);
- another possible interpretation is that the mediator/arbitrator could rule on the disagreement if he/she feels that a settlement is improbable even if the parties do not request his/her ruling (article 34).

If there is no agreement on a matter negotiated at the local or regional level, the decree continues to apply, which means that the decree can only be modified if the employer agrees to a modification (article 38).

Duration of local or regional agreements: two years, unless the parties modify them before their expiry (article 30).

3- Provincial Negotiations

Provincial negotiations of all provisions except wages and matters defined as locally or regionally negotiated (article 20).

The provincial collective agreement can provide modalities for discussion among the parties while it is in force (article 20).

Right to strike on matters negotiated provincially, but with specific mechanisms (article 78).

Publicizing the dispute: three possibilities:

1) one party can ask the Minister of Labour to appoint a mediator (article 23):
   - if no agreement is reached 30 days after he/she is appointed (or a longer period if the parties agree), the mediator makes a report to the parties with his/her recommendations for settling the dispute (article 24);
   - there is no absolute deadline by which the mediator has to have handed the report to the parties
   - this report is made public upon request by one of the parties (article 24)
   - notice is given to the Minister of Labour on the day on which the report is made public (article 27).
2) the parties can agree to a different mediation procedure (mediation council, public interest group, etc.) (article 25)
   - the persons involved in this mediation mechanism give a report containing their recommendations to both parties concerning settlement of the dispute (article 25)
   - this report is made public upon the request of one of the parties (article 25)
   - notice is given to the Minister of Labour on the day on which this report is made public (article 27)
3) the parties can agree to writing a joint report on their dispute and making it public (article 26)
   - notice is given to the Minister of Labour on the day on which this report is made public (article 27)
   - right to strike 20 days after the date on which the Minister of Labour received the notice of publication of the report provided for in 1), 2) or 3) (article 78).
   - probable duration of the provincial collective agreement: three years (if tradition is any indication).

4- Local or Regional Arrangements

- The provincial parties can provide for the possibility of local or regional arrangements on certain matters negotiated provincially (article 22).
- No right to strike over local or regional arrangements.

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A) WAGES

Through its draft legislation, the government isn't trying to create a Research Institute on Wages, because it doesn't need a law to do so. Its admitted goal is to "establish a new method of establishing wages for all public and para-public sector employees"(2). It wants to "set the wages for civil servants, school board, college and institutional employees"(3).

It is difficult to be against the establishment of the Institut de recherche sur la rémunération. As a party to negotiations, it could be helpful to have access to all kinds of information in order to draw a full picture of the context in which the negotiations are taking place. What is important is that the labour organizations have access to government research and studies in the sectors which concern them and that they also be able to commission studies they require, under certain conditions.

However, we can and must be against the fact that salaries would no longer be negotiated in the contractual sense, they would be merely be discussed. We cannot accept a system under which our **salaries** would be **set via regulations** and wage negotiations would end up being mere discussions on the Institut's annual report.

Withdrawing the public and para-public sector workers' right to negotiate their wages is also an attempt to make the unionized private sector workers solely responsible for protecting and improving the wage conditions of the entire Québec working population. Private/public wage comparisons are used to promote a uniformity by lowering the higher wages. What private sector union will succeed in creating a wage pattern and imposing it on others?

(2) Excerpted from the explanatory notes in the draft legislation.
(3) Excerpted from the explanatory notes in the draft legislation.

B) RIGHT TO STRIKE

It is worth reiterating that in the draft legislation, pressure tactics which include **work slowdowns or stoppages** cannot be used over issues negotiated locally. These matters, in our opinion, make up the bulk of the collective agreement.

But we consider the right to strike an essential pre-requisite for real negotiations.

Indeed, there can be no question, if we seek free negotiations, of not recognizing the right to exert bargaining power that would establish equilibrium between the parties; there can be no claim to serious negotiations when one of the two parties has its hands tied.

The workers have never employed pressure tactics in a capricious way. No one gets a kick out of losing wages and suspending one's job. The bargaining power is thus exerted both ways.

Strikes are regulated by specific rules (compulsory notice, essential services, etc.) The government was the first to disregard these rules, through special legislation. It now hopes to regularize this behaviour in the same way — by imposing a special law once again.

The workers have always been open to studying all possible means that would help negotiations along before undertaking serious action; they will continue to be open to this, but they must have the ultimate possibility of stopping work.

The Essential Services Council

The Essential Services Council is given much broader powers.

It could order a stop to an illegal situation; it would have the power to attribute a monetary value to a wrong which a citizen feels she/he has suffered and order a person who the Council rules responsible to pay such an amount of money. It could also order anything it deemed

reasonable in order to maintain the services to which the population is entitled.

The Council would be given the powers of ordering injunctions and declaring a party in contempt of court, powers equivalent to those of the Superior Court.

For example, the Council could order a return to work in an illegal strike in a CEGEP. If this order were not respected, contempt of court could be ruled. And the party responsible for the illegal situation could be sentenced by the Council to paying damages and interest in order to repair a wrong against the population.

The Council on Essential Services would thus have powers similar to those of the Superior Court conferred upon it without, however, being bound by the same rules of natural justice, i.e., the right to be heard.

C) DECENTRALIZATION OF NEGOTIATIONS

Negotiations in the public and para-public sectors have not always taken place on a national level. The present negotiating system with a central table and sectorial tables was established in response to repeated demands and pressure on the part of workers in order to obtain health and education services that were accessible and of equal quality in all the different regions, as well as in order to obtain uniform working conditions.

Also, it was imperative that we band together and coordinate ourselves in order to get through negotiations, make headway and protect our vested interests vis-à-vis our employer, the government. The latter has the entire state apparatus at its disposal, including the courts (it votes on legislation).

The state is not neutral and is incapable of being so, and even less so during negotiations. When we negotiate with our employers, we find ourselves asking the government to revise its orientations, and we try to influence its social and political decisions.

The establishment of a central table allowed us, as a labour movement, to end regional disparities, to promote the principle of a minimum decent wage and a closing of wage gaps, to defend principles of non-discrimination and to get recognition of parental rights.

If, within the sector, our jobs and our working conditions in general are comparable from one field to another, from one CEGEP to another, from one region to another, it's thanks to the present negotiating system. Without centralization and coordination, there would still be many disparities (before 1976, the job descriptions of teachers in the professional sector and those in the general sector were not even comparable). And such disparities would exist not only in terms of our working conditions, but also in terms of the nature and quality of teaching and of services provided.

The increased work load which we've experienced under the decree can be explained to a great extent by the diverting of resources that had been destined for teaching to administrative costs. Resources allocated for coordinating departments and internships, even the teacher/student ratio, are choices made by the government. How can we hope to recover these resources by negoiating locally, CEGEP by CEGEP? These matters are up to the local administration. If we want the resources allocated to coordination to be restored proportionately to past levels, we have to negotiate our work loads with the government and not with the personnel director who might claim to be open and sympathetic, but limited by his/her own budget. In order to force the government to change its mind about the decree and allocate the resources required for us to do our jobs, province-wide mobilization and bargaining power are needed.

But instead of helping us develop this kind of

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mobilization, decentralized negotiations would prevent it.

The same thing goes for women. Decentralization appears to us to be a complete contradiction of the social and political goals which the Federation supports in order to promote the cause of women and improve their situation. We know how isolated women can be in their CEGEPs. They make up only 30% of the teaching body, and are concentrated in certain disciplines. The end of the sectorial table and the establishment of local negotiations would have dangerous effects. A minority group such as women would become even more vulnerable if it became necessary to defend the slightest improvement of their lot CEGEP by CEGEP. Their minority position would just be further reinforced. For example, what hope is there of negotiating locally equal opportunity mechanisms that we have developed in our unions and which are supposed to apply to all the colleges in the same way? In how many workplaces would women make themselves heard?

What can we hope to gain locally, especially without the right to strike? Just look at what is happening in the CRT. What kind of gains have been made and at what cost?

Some people might think that once again, we're getting upset over nothing, that there's nothing wrong with wanting to negotiate certain non-monetary clauses locally, that in fact it should be that way, that each institution has its own particularities, that sufficient elbow room has to be left to local administrations and unions.

Aren't we right to worry and fear the worst? An assessment of PQ actions in the public and para-public sectors speaks for itself: cutbacks, special legislation and re-routing of social affairs monies to aid programs for private enterprise. Its plans for society, to "Build Québec", mean promoting and developing small and medium-sized business. In terms of education, its actions are even lovlier. In the CEGEPs: 400 non-renewals in the spring of 1978; the white paper; Bills 24 and 25[2] voted in June 1979; the refusal to allot 113 positions in adult education, its refusal to integrate adult education, the skimpy follow-up to the Jean Commission, the Québec-Canada agreement on professional training; its contempt and its denigrating campaign and attempts to make teachers feel guilty; Bills 68, 70 and 72; the decree, the increased work load, the massive expulsion of women from collegiate teaching, the refusal to give teachers tenure; Bill III; the PREC-RECs, the CECs, the establishment of specialized centres[3] and a marked desire to transfer certain options to the secondary level[3] and to regionalize others; the gradual setting up of institutional analysis and evaluation mechanisms; the draft legislation on the negotiating system. **The government's manner of doing things, its counter-reform and its attitude towards teachers are destroying the very bases on which the CEGEPs were built.**

The draft legislation would mean that the organization of work, transfer of personnel and labour rights would be negotiated locally. These are far from minor points. Being given time off for union duties, access to information, recognition of the unions as spokespersons and representatives of professors, the existence of the CRT, the right to meet and to post information are not insignificant. On the other hand, the organization of work and transfer of personnel also have to do with work loads and job security. Already, with the decree, since the distribution of resources among the disciplines lacks the framework of a provincial clause, discussion on the future of job descriptions has monopolized CRT members' time and energy for over a month.

And what about the mobilization work which this involves every spring in order to prevent any inequality and ensure that we don't find ourselves divided, played off against each other. All of this because there is no provincial stipulation to back us up. And it isn't by negotiating locally that we'll get priority for professors on the re-call list in adult education, or respect for their field and their seniority, or assurance that they won't end up as permanent

(2) For a brief summary of the contents of these different pieces of legislation and the meaning of acronyms, see the appendix.

(3) Specialized centres operate in traditionally male fields and the options which the government wants to transfer to the secondary level are traditionally female.

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substitutes, and that their assignments won't be incitements or invitation to quit[1]. We might also ask ourselves what the future holds for professors on availability lists if job security is deemed to be on the basis of the institution where each works. What kind of re-training or re-location opportunities will be available to them?

Also, within a context in which local administrations are being asked to apply the cutbacks, increased work loads and evaluation mechanisms, agreeing to local negotiations on matters such as union rights, the organization of work and personnel transfers and promotions would be risky, not to mention dangerous, and especially so if we do not have the right to strike.

This said, we mustn't shut the door to all local adjustments of certain provincially-negotiated clauses. Rather, we should provide for the possibility of adjusting provincially-negotiated clauses in order to adapt them to specific conditions in different CEGEPs (e.g.: the possibility of flexible distribution of resources among the different disciplines, the use of re-training funds...). The present system allows for this: it is possible to come to an agreement during sectorial negotiations on clauses providing the possibility of local adjustments. What is important, however, is that local negotiations be conditioned by provincial stipulations, and that such stipulations be a guarantee and starting point for all local negotiations. What the kind of local negotiations suggested in the draft legislation would lead to is not this kind of adjustment but rather different collective agreements from one CEGEP to the next and even greater disparities.

The negotiating system must, nevertheless, preserve its present latitude and allow the parties to send certain matters to the local negotiating table, if both parties agree to do so. But certain matters must not be considered automatically as having to be negotiated locally, as is the case in the draft legislation.

Another issue which deserves our attention is that of local negotiating committees, bearing in mind that this would be in the context of ongoing, permanent negotiations. Would they be the CRTs, turned into negotiating committees? What facilities and resources would they have? How often would their members be given paid leave for committee work? Would the FNEEQ be in a position to provide the necessary technical and political support? Is there not a risk that it would become immediately over-worked?

(1) Assignments, for example, such as "correct the spelling mistakes of 3,000 CEGEP students".

D) PERMANENT NEGOTIATIONS OR DESYNCHRONIZED NEGOTIATIONS

Local matters, i.e., the organization of work, transfer and promotion of personnel and union rights would be negotiable at all times, upon agreement of the parties concerned. If renegotiated, each clause must have a minimum duration of two years, unless, once again, the local parties decide otherwise. That is what is meant by on-going, permanent negotiations. The government has grafted one of its greatest hopes onto this: the withdrawal of the right to strike in the public sector. So, imagine the next round of negotiations: wages are set by decree every year; province-wide stipulations will be in effect for three or four years, if past negotiations are any indication, and local stipulations will be signed for two years; and, if the collective agreement is re-opened during these two years, each new agreement will last two years. Thus, for example, the organization of work could be negotiated one year after transfers and promotion of personnel.

Example:

Wages	1986
Organization of work	1986-1987
Transfer of personnel	1986-1987 — re-opened in 1987 — new agreement 1987-1988
Province-wide stipulations	1986-1988

By staggering the collective agreement in this way, the government splits an entity that belongs to us, acquired and refined over years and through hard struggles.

And what could we hope to improve in our working conditions, if the right to strike exists only for modifying our group insurance plan?

E. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVATE COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY UNIONS

The unions in private teaching institutions and in universities are not specifically covered by the draft legislation, and will continue to be covered by the Labour Code, although this is far from being a protection, as we shall see further along. The difficult situation created by budgetary cutbacks in these sectors indicates beyond any doubt that they will also be deeply affected by the government's plan, if it ever becomes law. Because one of the aspects of this law is to permit further budgetary cutbacks. Let's have a closer look at this.

During the last round of governmental decrees, all of the employees in these institutions experienced the cutbacks imposed by the government and then experienced the same wage "progression". We must expect a powerful attempt, either on the part of the government or on the part of management, to repeat the 1982 coup. The risk of the employees of these institutions being absorbed into the Institut de recherche sur la rémunération work and ending up with decrees as well is a highly possible one. All the more so in that the draft legislation includes provisions (article 41) that allow the inclusion of new groups, the only requirement being that the government want it that way.

If this is not the case, wage negotiations will be no easy task. Employers, as is already the case, will have great difficulty forecasting their wage costs for more than one year at a time (assuming that wages are decreed every year in the public sector). There is every indication that these employers will "decree" wages for a much longer period, allowing themselves sufficient leeway based on the bleakest forecasts.

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As for other working conditions, (work load, job security, etc.), they will be negotiated in a context in which only these institutions will have (perhaps) the right to strike out of the entire teaching community, and will inevitably be compared by employers to public sector workers in areas where conditions are least developed. Could these unions assume a leadership role all by themselves in terms of working conditions in the teaching field? Could they stop the progressive deterioration of their conditions, especially since passage of Bill II for private institutions and given the obvious intentions of the government vis-à-vis the whole issues of funding universities? It appears very likely that it would once again be the concessions of these employees that will sought in an attempt to assure quality of education, concessions which have already been obtained in private institutions after repeated threats to shutdown or carry out massive lay-offs.

The new powers conferred upon the Essential Services Council will apply, in our opinion, to these institutions. This could be done upon its own initiative or upon request by a person interested in studying the consequences of a conflict, from the perspective of services to which the population is entitled (see "Key Aspects").

And finally, it should be pointed out that the bill is being tabled at a time when the Beaudry Commission is holding hearings, mandated to make recommendation to the government on reforming the Labour Code (excluding the public sector and the construction sector). Two-thirds of the unionized workers in Québec cannot be robbed of their right to strike without this having repercussions on the other workers of the province. The model which the government wants to impose on the public sector could inspire a "private sector" version. In this sense, the draft legislation gives us a bitter foretaste of the new Labour Code.

THE NEED TO GET ORGANIZED

Overall, the present negotiating system, although not perfect, satisfies us. It is the result of struggles which we in the public sector have waged, just like all the laws and regulations which recognize workers' rights are to a great extent the results of labour struggles.

The government's project establishes a negotiating system and limits the right to strike in such a way as to dismiss all substance from both. It is a direct threat to the life of our labour organizations and the headway which we have made. Pooling our resources and centralizing our negotiations had allowed us to correct serious inequalities and improve the quality of services. We are now facing the possibility of a twenty-year setback.

The reform is aimed at 225,000 unionized women. Any setback imposed on this group constitutes a setback not just for all the working women of Québec but also for all Québec women. Let's not forget that when the state cuts back in public services, the extra unpaid job generally falls upon women's shoulders.

In Québec, the unionized workers are a minority — about one woman out of three and about one unionized worker out of two belong to the public and para-public sector. Withdrawing our right to negotiate our wages is equivalent to muzzling the labour movement in order to further reduce the workers' share of national revenue.

We wish to reiterate that the negotiating system applicable to public sector workers must be based on a certain number of fundamental principles that take into account both our status as workers and the sector in which we are employed. These principles are:

- the negotiability of overall wages
- the negotiability of all working conditions
- the right to negotiate provincially
- the capacity to make necessary adjustments at the local level
- recognition of the inalienable right to strike
- the need to perfect mechanisms concerning essential services.

We no longer have any choice; we have to organize.

We have to make our refusal of this reform visible.

We cannot accept a situation in which the public sector workers would be denied the same rights as other unionized workers. Our right to negotiate and our right to strike translate into our ability to obtain decent working conditions. It is also the capacity to maintain the quality of services and increase their efficiency, especially during an economic crisis, when the demand for services is all the more urgent.

APPENDIX

Bill 24:	Act to establish the Council of Colleges
Bill 25:	Act modifying the Act on Colleges
Bill 68:	Act modifying the pension plan (RREGOP) for the worse
Bill 70:	Act cutting wages in the public sector in 1982
Bill 72:	Act modifying the Essential Services Council
'll 111:	Act ordering teachers back to work in February 1983
PREC:	Draft legislation on collegiate studies regulations
REC:	Collegiate studies regulations
CEC:	Collegiate studies certificate
CRT:	Labour Relations Committee



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